The agreement formed the principle of “mutual coexistence” (اليش السششترك) between the different Lebanese sects and their “appropriate political representation” (صحة التاثيلللاارائئڊل¤¤اارژئئ¤¤¤اراتتيلللارcle) as the main objective of parliamentary electoral laws after the civil war.  He also restructured the political system of the National Pact in Lebanon by deriving part of the power of the Maronite Christian community that had obtained a privileged status in Lebanon under French rule. Before the agreement, the Sunni Muslim prime minister was appointed and responsible by the Maronite president. After the Taif agreement, the prime minister was responsible for legislative power, as in a traditional parliamentary system. Therefore, the agreement changed the power-sharing formula that had favored Christians at a 50:50 ratio and strengthened the powers of the Sunni prime minister over those of the Christian president.  Before the Taif negotiations, a Maronite Christian, General Michel Aoun, was appointed Prime Minister by President Amine Gemayel on September 22, 1988. This had provoked a serious political crisis of a divided prime minister, the post being reserved for a Sunni Muslim under the 1943 national pact and Omar Karami held the post. The Taif agreement helped to overcome this crisis by preparing for the election of a new president. Political sectarianism in Lebanon was refined and adopted by the independence movement in November 1943 by the “National Pact”, an un written agreement that laid the foundations for a sectarian system in the Republic after independence. Surprisingly, the pact survived the civil war from 1975 to 1990. The conflict began in part as a result of calls for the abolition of political sectarianism. Nevertheless, political sectarianism was reaffirmed and even consolidated in the 1989 Taif Agreement, also known as the Document of National Unity.
In that regard, Lebanon has the illustrious privilege of having been a pioneer in the establishment of a system based on sectarianism, as well as a laboratory that highlights its dysfunctions and limitations. Karam Karam explains how both the content and implementation of the 1989 Taif Peace Agreement excluded genuine political reforms or social changes due to structural deficiencies, including: an erroneous revision of sectarian power-sharing agreements and a dysfunctional executive troika; The transfer of primary responsibility from the State to the Syrian trusteeship; ensuring the power of warlords; and the marginalization of central social issues. Karam offers constructive lessons for the future, based on a framework of political decentralization and balanced reforms within the framework of a clear and progressive strategy. The Taif Agreement officially ended the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990). It was an internal Lebanese agreement that was discussed, negotiated and concluded in 1989 in the city of Taif, Saudi Arabia, under the auspices of Riyadh and the Arab League, with the support of the United States and direct surveillance of Syria. . . .